The Myth of Desperation

One narrative that’s been floating around the lyin’ press throughout the past two years is that that Trump and Sanders voters were mainly driven by desperation -that one wouldn’t vote for a candidate of dramatic change if one was perfectly satisfied with one’s affairs.

Perhaps the perfect counterexample to that is the county in Michigan with the highest median household income and lowest poverty rate in the state -Livingston.

Livingston County is many things, but it ain’t desperate. It’s rich, very Republican -it went for John McCain with 55% of the vote in November 2008, and 61% of the vote for Mitt Romney in 2012- and is not the place where one would find out-of-work factory workers or coal miners discontented with their economic situation, because there aren’t much of them. And, during the 2016 primaries, the candidate there who got the most votes was Donald Trump. The candidate who got the second-most votes there was Bernie Sanders (indeed, Livingston County had a higher Bernie share in the Democratic primary than all the counties surrounding it). The candidate who got the third-most votes there was John Kasich -this county isn’t as socially conservative as the western part of the state. Nor did woke neocon Marco Rubio appeal there much -he got a lower share of the Republican vote there than in the rest of the state, and Rubio and Kasich’s vote share combined would not have sufficed to prevent Trump from winning it in the primary.

Now, before 2016, Michigan hadn’t had a real Democratic primary for ages. But it did have real Republican primaries in 1996, 2000, 2008, and 2012. And guess who won the vote in Livingston County (a solidly Republican county, it must be remembered) each time? Mitt Romney by double digits in 2012, Mitt Romney by double digits in 2008, George W. Bush by single digits in 2000 [most MI counties went for McCain at the time], and Bob Dole by double digits in 1996 (Buchanan did well in Lapeer and St. Clair, though, and nearly won the famous Macomb). Not Ron Paul. Not Mike Huckabee. Not Alan Keyes. Rich guy Mitt Romney and establishment candidate George W. Bush.

There are other examples of this. Nevada’s third congressional district. Long Island. In the general election only, Minnesota’s sixth and second congressional districts (though Trump did far worse than Rubio there in the caucuses, he did better than Romney there in the general election).

Now, yes, Trump and Sanders really did appeal more to those among the really desperate who are White, at least, relative to Ted Cruz and Hillary Clinton. The results of the 2016 primaries in the poorest non-Hispanic White majority congressional district in the country (KY-05) are enough to prove this. But that does not mean economic or social desperation was either a necessary or sufficient condition for Trump or Sanders support (many Whites in desperate rural areas in the South also voted for HRC in the primary).

Advertisements

Calculating Partisan Gerrymandering (Part III of a III-part series)

Transforming a percentage into a probability of victory is fairly easy. Convert a percentage into the log odds of the percentage, multiply that by some integer, and convert that back into a percentage.

By what integer should I multiply the log-odds(percentage)? The answer varies.

I first tried this out with Michigan’s presidential vote in 2012. Michigan is known, after all, to be a high-quality gerrymander on the federal level. The result, somewhat surprisingly, was that given low enough number the log-odds(percentage) is multiplied by [i.e., given high enough values of voter swinginess] it was the Democrats who were favored under that House map (i.e., the 2011 House map in MI was a dummymander), due to the safety of the Dem seats and the complete lack of safety of the Republicans’ seats (or so it appeared) that year.

The first row in the below table is the number the log-odds (percentage) was multiplied by to produce the estimated probabilities of victory in the below rows.

However, by the 2016 presidential election numbers, the Republicans became clearly favored due to the newfound safety of their seats and a newfound danger to the Dem seats:

Note: the two-party HRC percentage is listed as over 50% in the above table due to more Democratic districts having lower voter turnout, and each district being counted equally during averaging the vote.

The number one should multiply the log-odds percentage by remains to be debated with historical statistical evidence; but I would be surprised if it were not within the range of three to twenty.

How to actually measure partisan gerrymandering (Part II of a three-part series)

I. NC plan>>>PA plan
In the previous post, I attempted to show the tradeoffs available to a designer of a gerrymander with this graph (see previous post for an explanation):

This approach would work well in states in which the districts of the favored party are all roughly equal in partisanship, such as North Carolina.

(X-axis is the name of the district, the Y-axis is the two-party Democratic vote share on the presidential level in each district)

However, not all states wanted to create a bunch of Likely Favored Party districts that would give the incumbent party supermajorities in neutral years, but would risk the opposing party gaining every seat in the state in a wave year favorable to the opposing party. An example of this is Pennsylvania’s House districts (note Tom Marino of PA was selected to be the President’s Drug Czar just today, so this post is perfect timing).

Pennsylvania has, in my judgment three tossup districts, all of which are held by Republicans, two Lean R districts, six Likely R districts, and two Safe R districts (one of which is Marino’s). There is also one Lean D heavily Obama-Trump district (PA-17), which actually was close enough in 2012 as to be acceptable for a wiser (or more partisan) Republican state legislature to turn into a Lean R district even then under more aggressive lines, and actually went for Trump by its present boundaries by more than both the Lean R districts and, naturally, all three of the the tossups. The fact it has a Democratic representative now is a huge and inexcusable failure of the Republican state legislature in 2011. The current Pennsylvania plan is, in my judgment, a mess, much inferior to North Carolina’s, and unnecessarily creates opportunities for the Democrats where, by any Republican’s judgment, there should be none. It would be relatively easy to create a redistricting plan for Pennsylvania with four Safe D seats and the other fifteen Likely R. My judgment is that the risk of all seats going to the opposing party in a wave year is worth it, and is much superior to being subject to the whims of “moderates” who are afraid of alienating their district’s swing voters in a general election while the favored party is in power. But how does one judge plans such as PA’s, anyway?

II. How does one measure the utility of tossup seats?

Another question, obviously related to the above one, is how does one measure the utility to a party of redistricting a district from Likely Opposing Party to Lean Opposing Party. For example, here’s my proposed Republican gerrymander of Indiana (no county splits, resulting in some serious malapportionment in Marion, but that’s not important here). The 2016 U.S. Senate race is used as a guide:

IN-01: In green. Two-party vote for Bayh: 52.47%. Rating: Lean D, instead of the current Likely D. This is an Obama-Trump district. The right kind of Republican can definitely get elected here. Certainly it would not be left the only uncontested seat in Indiana, as it actually was.
IN-02: In dark blue. Two-party vote for Bayh: 44.32%. Rating: Likely R.
IN-03: In red. Two-party vote for Bayh: 42.14%. Rating: Likely R.
IN-04: In orange. Two-party vote for Bayh: 38.21%. Rating: Safe R.
IN-05: In light blue. Two-party vote for Bayh: 39.84%. Rating: Safe R.
IN-06: In white. Two-party vote for Bayh: 36.52%. Rating: Safe R.
IN-07: Marion (yellow). Two-party vote for Bayh: 61.87%. Rating: Safe D.
IN-08: In light yellow. Two-party vote for Bayh: 44.35%. Rating: Likely R.
IN-09: In purple. Two-party vote for Bayh: 39.18%. Rating: Safe R.

For the current (actual) Indiana map, see here and here -click on the districts for info about them.

HRC got 47.50% of the two-party vote in my IN-01 and Obama in 2012 got 54.70%. In real life, HRC got 56.57% of the two-party vote in the actual IN-01 in 2016 and Obama in 2012 got 62.01%. Obviously, my redistricting plan significantly improved the GOP’s position in Indiana’s first district while not reducing the utility of the rest of the GOP-held seats for the GOP. The reason my IN-01, which has very similar political demographics to the actual PA-17, is more acceptable in Indiana is because Indiana is a more Republican state. Thus, it would be an improvement over the present plan. But how does one measure that? How does one display that using this curve?

I do not see a way for the above curve to be useful in cases in which districts within each side’s are of heterogeneous partisanship.

After thinking about it, the best advice I can give in regards to measuring gerrymandering is to multiply each seat by the probability of victory of the favored party. The maximization of these seat equivalents should be the measure of the worth of a gerrymander. Relative to the actual Indiana House map, my redistricting plan increases the chance of a GOP victory in IN-01 by more than it increases the risk to the Republican-held districts. I thus consider it a better gerrymander for the GOP than the actual GOP plan.

Measuring the probability of victory of the favored party in each district should be fairly simple (I will do this in the third post of this series), and historical data should be used for this purpose. Of course, the most important variable for determining the probability of victory of a party in a district is the district’s presidential vote. If it’s lower for the favored party, the probability of victory for that party is, all else being equal, lower. Historical swing data for congressional districts for the past few cycles should also be brought into account.

So, the above is how to measure a partisan gerrymander.

III. A fair map

Of course, for every villain -the partisan gerrymander- there necessarily has to be a hero to compare it to -the fair map. Of course, the question now becomes: what is a fair map? Certainly, a fair map cannot be a map in which each district is representative of the state in an identical fashion. Otherwise, Massachusetts’s map would be called a fair map, and Tennessee’s map would be considered as biased toward the Democrats. Obviously, neither is the case. Ideally, a fair map should have its median seat (now it enters into play) be representative of the state, though this is obviously not important (as I’ve shown in the previous post, comparing the median seat to the state is not an important measure of gerrymandering).

Perhaps this could be a fair map for a 60% Democratic state:

Of course, when each district becomes 10% more Democratic, the state as a whole won’t become 10% more Democratic, because districts 1 and 2 in the above graph cannot get any more Democratic. Of course, Dem chance of victory can also be used in place of Dem vote share in the y-axis of the above graph.

IV. Issues with the Princeton Gerrymander Tests

The Princeton Election Consortium developed three tests for gerrymandering. I don’t think the current ones are especially valid or useful.

The first test is right out; Texas is penalized because of Will Hurd’s narrow victory, despite the fact he’s obviously going down in 2018. A streak of luck in closely-contested tossup races is obviously no sign of a gerrymander, it’s just a sign of a side’s better campaigning.

The second test is also barely useful; it only measures the partisanship of one seat, the median seat, and, as the authors of the site admit, isn’t very useful at all in safe states.

The third test is a votes-seats curve. To which extent the specific votes-seats curve used is accurate is debatable.

The biggest problem with the tests is that they use the House vote instead of the presidential vote. The problem with this is that this makes no sense due to candidate heterogeneity. Collin Peterson ain’t Keith Ellison. The presidential vote should be used instead of the House vote to account for such differences.

Explaining partisan gerrymandering

In the United States, both state legislative and congressional districts are designed by politicians. These politicians, especially in the Republican-controlled states (this has only been true since 2010 or so) tend to design districts to give a clear and consistent advantage to their party. The canonical example of this is North Carolina (current [smoother] district lines):

The x-axis indicates the district, the y-axis shows the two-party Democratic presidential vote. Given the highly sorted party system currently existing in the United States, the presidential vote functions as a very good proxy for House candidate vote and is more appropriate here than House vote since the candidates are the same in every district. As one can readily see, in North Carolina, Democrats are packed into only three out of thirteen congressional districts, even though they won over 48% of the two-party presidential vote in both 2016 and 2012. Only in 2011 were the lines redrawn to favor the Republicans (and they will continue to favor the Republicans for a long time), before, they favored the Democrats since the 1890s.

Given that not all gerrymanders are created equal, several ways have been proposed to measure this phenomenon.

I. Insufficiency of commonly used methods

One way has been to compare the difficulty of recapturing the majority of the seats relative to winning the majority of the two-party vote in a state by looking at the difference between the presidential vote of the median district and the statewide presidential vote. However, one of the most gerrymandered states by this measure is Tennessee, which is a 60%+ Republican state with two Democratic seats (out of nine total)! Massachusetts (a 60%+ Democratic state with the same number of seats as TN) does not have even a single Republican seat! Yet, nobody can seriously call Massachusetts gerrymandered against the Republicans. Tennessee’s creation of more Democratic seats almost necessitates a higher difference between the median seat and the state due to more Democratic voters having to be taken away from the state’s median seat into the Democratic-held seats. Thus, the median district approach cannot be used as a serious way to measure gerrymandering, as it only looks at one district-the median one.

Another way to measure gerrymandering has been some kind of way of comparing share of seats won by v. share votes cast for a party. This is also a very flawed method.

The problem with these approaches is that they cannot distinguish between this (super-weak Democratic gerrymander in an evenly tied state with ten districts):

and this (strong Democratic gerrymander in an evenly tied state with ten districts):

But pretends there are giant differences between this (super-weak Democratic gerrymander in an evenly tied state with ten districts):

and this (super-weak Republican gerrymander):

As you can see, the problem with this approach is that the most gerrymandered maps by this measure will inevitably be dummymanders -that is, maps in which the party drawing the districts is so thinly spread out, if the popular vote shifts uniformly to the opposing party just a little, the map will look identical to a gerrymander designed by the opposing party.

In any case, any gerrymander has to be judged on two criteria: seat maximization and safety. There is a direct trade-off between the two (as thus, for an evenly tied state in which any and all district boundaries are permitted):

Notice that the curve is bowed in. However, in practice, the difference between a two point and a ten point presidential win margin is worth much more in terms of a House member’s win probability than that between a thirty point and fifty point presidential margin. Given this, the top and the bottom portions of the y-axis should be compressed and the middle expanded. With the axis like this, the curve would be bowed out, and the point of most correct gerrymander be placed at the outermost point of the curve.

Such curves should be designed for every state in the union with a reasonable number of House districts to test for gerrymanders there. Generally, the optimal average win margin for a favored party (that is, one that does not waste votes, but still keeps seats reasonably safe) is probably around ten points for an evenly tied state. Any good gerrymander should be directly on the possibilities frontier (as my strong D gerrymander graph with red bars is), not within it (as my super-weak D gerrymander graph with red bars is).

Ideally, a gerrymander should have

  1. Zero seats flipping on the presidential level between elections outside wave years (on the logic that it is better to have a bird in the hand than two in the bush)
  2. Total unity between the House member’s party and the party of the presidential candidate that wins the district (the state that is easily farthest away from fulfilling this ideal is Minnesota; the closest states to this ideal are, as far as I can tell from a quick glance, Maine, Missouri, and North Carolina).
  3. Maximized number of seats given a state’s partisan lean

Goals 1. and 3. are obviously inconsistent if a state hugely changes partisanship between elections.

Pennsylvania failed all the criteria in 2016 (it had split districts both ways, seats flipped in presidential vote between 2012 and 2016, and obviously it didn’t maximize GOP seats in 2016, and probably not in 2012, either), but it’s a pretty clear GOP gerrymander regardless. Wisconsin blatantly failed all the criteria in 2016 and probably failed the third criterion (though not the second) in 2012, though it was a very clear pro-GOP gerrymander in 2012. Michigan and Ohio satisfied all the criteria in 2012, but did not satisfy the last criterion in 2016, due to the state changing partisan lean between those years and there being obvious Democratic seats in both states which could be removed in 2016. North Carolina clearly satisfied all the criteria in 2016, but had some disunity between House member’s and district presidential candidate victor’s party in 2012. Texas satisfied none of the criteria in either 2012 or 2016.

House district partisanship map-link will be updated as news arrive

https://fusiontables.google.com/embedviz?q=select+col5%3E%3E1+from+1QVyAZxFvArMqkEAVnTeLmAhebS0bwzgiDhn3qdhK&viz=MAP&h=false&lat=37.05628800013914&lng=-93.02554824999993&t=1&z=4&l=col5%3E%3E1&y=2&tmplt=2&hml=KML
The “composite” is calculated as thus.

If the seats were uncontested, 2/3 of the weight is on the 2012 presidential vote, the rest on the 2016 presidential vote; i.e., uncontested seats are treated as if they were open seats. I have also calculated the open seats listed as open in 2018 in Wikipedia in this fashion. The weighing is based on David Shor’s data. https://gist.github.com/davidshor/5ea3e6c4e80cdc87243253e47c47bc41

If they are seats contested in 2016 with an incumbent, 50% of the weight is on the 2016 House vote, 30% is on the 2016 presidential vote, and 20% is on the 2012 presidential vote. This weighing is roughly based on comparing the 2014 and 2016 House elections and taking note of the increased importance of the 2012 presidential vote in the 2017 specials relative to 2016’s House races.

All data is from the Daily Kos.

The rank is the ranking of the districts by partisanship by the composite index.

You can get the source data by clicking “source” in the map legend.

The districts held by the 2017 special election GOP winners are calculated as though their House members in 2016 were still serving today, without regard to the 2017 special election results (as different from the 2016 results as apples are from oranges) as they really cannot be viewed as open seats in 2018.

No attempt is made to account for asymmetric deterioration of incumbent bonuses in bad midterms for a president’s party, as happened in 2006 and 2010 (thus Collin Peterson and other Trump district Dems are probably underrated with this composite).

Other House district maps:
2016 House (two-party):
https://fusiontables.google.com/embedviz?q=select+col5%3E%3E1+from+1Dg51R3pGS5r0HrSuoHSUXR_IxZIfcClrwl7gsLXk&viz=MAP&h=false&lat=37.05628800013914&lng=-93.02554824999993&t=1&z=4&l=col5%3E%3E1&y=2&tmplt=2&hml=KML
2016 presidential vote by congressional district (two-party):
https://fusiontables.google.com/embedviz?q=select+col18+from+1_NolOUGbBkWbAl5TMMZrpba-OazN7DBf7dvSTUie&viz=MAP&h=false&lat=37.05628800013914&lng=-93.02554824999993&t=1&z=4&l=col18&y=2&tmplt=2&hml=GEOCODABLE
2012 presidential vote by congressional district (two-party):
https://fusiontables.google.com/embedviz?q=select+col18+from+1T2Q2YVeHXfCqiV466yZqciXyOF48DMGD3cZ2hxac&viz=MAP&h=false&lat=37.05628800013914&lng=-93.02554824999993&t=1&z=4&l=col18&y=2&tmplt=2&hml=GEOCODABLE
Two-Party Swing between 2012 and 2016 presidential vote:
https://fusiontables.google.com/embedviz?q=select+col18+from+18XmouMM-7G0SD_6dykEyD9gfgNnGmoiPpfbIdMYV&viz=MAP&h=false&lat=37.05628800013914&lng=-93.02554824999993&t=1&z=4&l=col18&y=2&tmplt=2&hml=GEOCODABLE
Two-party House Dem vote performance over two-party HRC vote in 2016:
https://fusiontables.google.com/embedviz?q=select+col18+from+1IdPacdK9LIHkbXRyC2l4WdZx5E6RXCqDmwS70jSK&viz=MAP&h=false&lat=37.05628800013914&lng=-93.02554824999993&t=1&z=4&l=col18&y=2&tmplt=2&hml=GEOCODABLE

“Nation of Ideas” is a crock

There is a common saying in America that the U.S. is a nation founded on ideas, not the people ruling it. This is a typical piece expressing this take, and everyone I know, both on the far left and far right, is bashing it, for good reason. Firstly, it is intellectually dishonest to refer to Coolidge’s statements about religion without referring to his remarks on race:

There are racial considerations too grave to be brushed aside for any sentimental reasons. Biological laws tell us that certain divergent people will not mix or blend. The Nordics propagate themselves success fully. With other races, the outcome shows deterioration on both sides. Quality of mind and body suggests that observance of ethnic law is as great necessity to a nation as immigration law.

(hat tip:@tcjfs).

The founders were clear on freedom of worship and practice within the country for all types of religion (including Islam) compatible with a Federal government not discriminating among them, but there is no implication in their writings that the government of the country would be anything other than of, by, and for people of the White race. Naturalization was originally limited only to free White persons of good moral character. As soon as there was a major influx of non-White immigration into the country (from China), the party here most favorable to Irish, French, and German immigration (at the time, the Democratic) turned swiftly to that most disfavorable to Chinese immigration. Now, I think that was, though wisely conservative, not the most advisable course of action, given that the Chinese presently here are generally reasonably patriotic, hard-working, intelligent, etc. But it was the traditional view of things, and the writings of the founders were by no means contrary to it.

In any case, ideas do not enforce themselves. The Constitution is not law in America; the decrees of judges, presidents, and Congress are. Any cursory examination of American history will serve to swiftly confirm this. Appointing or electing the right people to make those decrees is the foundation of proper government in America. And for that, the propriety of the electorate and the appointers must be assured.

What American Independence?

Tags

,

Two years ago, I wisely wrote A Strange Utopia, which remains relevant even unto this day with Trump taking the place of Jeb (both are essentially the same figure for the purpose of the short story, as far as I’m concerned -look at how Trump has kept DACA in place and failed to remove sanctions on Russia).

Today is the day America celebrates its independence. And today is, as a prominent alt-right Twitter poster said (can’t find the tweet; I forgot the exact wording, spent some time searching for it), the first year in which I’ve become rather detached from the whole idea of American independence. What meaning is American independence when the country is bound down by the chains of endless immigration, to promote big government, and ultimately, its decline and supersession by firstly China and, secondly, yes, Russia and Japan, those infinitely media-maligned countries notorious for their low native fertility. Yet, what is the purpose of high native fertility if it is dysgenic; a transformation of the United States into Mexico or, just as bad, the tragic coast of Southern California (where my fellow American George Michael Grena lives, in one of the congressional districts with the most disgusting politics in the country -I, in Michigan, empathize!). Take a look at the Mississippi exit polls by age if you do not believe what America is becoming. Any hint of the expression of the great Democratic platform of 1852, by the 2030s, will be dead. The McGovernites will have won.

Likewise, America remains bound down by the toxic-fruited chains of foreign obligation -and look how its partisans admire them! All but four deeply conservative representatives out of four hundred thirty five -and not one Senator- voted to reaffirm America’s commitment to the horrendous and obsolete (despite the President’s statement to the contrary) North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which binds this relatively great (if not as much as it used to be) country to foolishly commit to the defense of such great (if one has low standards) nations as Albania, Montenegro, Romania, and Latvia. Happy slaves so many of your fellow citizenry are, American! And how they cheer their slavery! Independence? Bondage.

And as a final insult, America remains forced by its so-called “representatives” to pay billions of dollars a year in tribute to Israel, a country that has taken advantage of us so much -how can, as the President used to say, we call America great when the other countries are taking so, so much advantage of us in every arena? Now Israel, though a typical Southern European country in many respects, is certainly one that is an example for all the world in its commitment to its national sovereignty. Look at its border fence, its infinite arms and pockets stretching into so many of the great capitals of the world, its pro-natalism, its commitment against being forced to defend, pay tribute, or invite the residents of any other country. And how foolish is America not to follow in that example?

The reason I remain so detached is precisely because of the presidency being occupied by the only man who could even remotely break these chains binding America to slavery -and his consistent refusal to do so.

As long as America is bound down by the chains of immigration imperialism, the toxic terrorist organization known as the NATO alliance, and its perpetual and obliging treatment as puppet by the Jewish state, how can we celebrate Independence Day with any honor?

The NRSV almost unreadable without notes (or, a bizarre “feature” of the NRSV)

While reading the epistle to the Hebrews and comparing its rendering in various translations, I discovered the NRSV alone, among all translations, translated every reference to “man” and “the son of man” in Hebrews 2:6-8 to refer to mankind as a whole! To keep consistent, the NRSV continues to use “them” instead of “him” throughout the entire quotation from the Psalm, and even going beyond that into the author of Hebrews’ interpretation at the end of v. 8!

Bug or feature? Your mileage may vary. I think that though this is a plausible interpretation of the passage, it can hardly be called a translation. “Son of man” in Hebrews 2:6-8 could be plausibly referring to Jesus (as suggested by Hebrews 2:9 referencing Hebrews 2:7) or to mortal humans. The Catholic NABRE, quite contrary to the NRSV, explicitly adopts the Christological interpretation of the passage in its notes.

This is why I recommend never relying on any edition of the NRSV without the translators’ notes as one’s primary Bible. Now, the NRSV does have good notes; on this, there can be no denial. But a translation that is unreadable without the notes can hardly be called a translation.

A reason to use the NRSV/ESV/NABRE over the ASV/NASB/others

Tags

The NRSV/ESV/NABRE incorporate a lot more DSS/Septuagint readings into their main OT text than the other versions.

Take, for example, Deuteronomy 32:8 and 32:43, both of which make much more sense when relying on the DSS/Seputagint in place of the Masoretic Text.

My physical copy of the NASB95 doesn’t even contain any notes at all on the page containing v.43 and doesn’t have a note for v.8 (despite the LXX version of Deuteronomy 32:43 being quoted in Hebrews 1:6!). The ASV, of course, can be excused for being written before the discovery of the DSS.

The NLT also uses the DSS readings in both verses, but that translation is too liberal in general to make a good study bible.

The HCSB uses the MT readings in both verses, but has good notes, so it gets three quarters credit.

The NET uses the DSS reading in v. 8 but curiously uses the MT reading in v. 43 without a note (!), again, despite the obvious Hebrews 1:6 issue, so it gets half-credit.

The ESV remains probably the best of the modern translations, though the generally somewhat less literal NRSV and NABRE are not far off.

Remarks on Bible Translations

Tags

, , , , ,

Section 1

My favorite translation for most purposes is the 1901 ASV (American Standard Version). It’s out of copyright, so noone’s gonna sue ya if you use it. It was a product of a well-respected translation committee, so it’s very much acceptable for academic citation. It relies on a superior textual basis to the KJV/NKJV/YLT. It consistently transliterates the tetragrammaton instead of obscuring it with “LORD” in small caps, as most translations do. It’s fairly literal, surprisingly faithful to the original text (e.g., keeping all of Marks “kai” (“and”)s; the ESV and NASB keep most, the NRSV and most other modern translations keep hardly any) and keeps some of the KJV’s linguistic variety (e.g., pronouns), which is often quite helpful in exposing some of the subtlety of the Greek text (e.g., Matthew 20:20-28). The best online edition of the 1901 ASV (including the notes) is on BibleGateway. The CCEL and BibleHub versions are partially defective (e.g., their Revelation 19:16 wrongly has “KINGS of KINGS”, rather than, as is proper, “KING OF KINGS”). I generally prefer the principles of the American translators to those of the English Revised Version (though the English principles are better in some places, e.g., Exodus 20:13). The most obvious problem with the ASV is that its insistence on KJV English to reduce backwards incompatibility is often more a liability than an asset to comprehensibility by modern-day Americans.

As for the WEB (World English Bible; a public-domain translation loosely based on the ASV), it is the product of one man with an excessively simple website layout, and so is not suitable for academic citation. I like some of the translation changes it makes (it makes the language far more modern and comprehensible, transliterates Gehenna instead of translating it as hell, changes the transliteration of the tetragrammaton from Jehovah to Yahweh, etc.), but it tends to blunt the force of the original ASV, removing some linguistic dynamism (e.g., all of Mark’s “kai”s are removed, as is the KJV/ASV’s versatility with pronouns), and unnecessarily adds some inconsistent translation, as well (e.g., Matthew 2:11 v. Mark 15:19). Overall, I prefer the ASV.

The earlier YLT is also a very good translation on its principles, though it’s also subject to some obviously unnecessary inconsistent translation (e.g., Red Sea/Sea of Suph) and I’m not a fan of its textual basis.

Section 2

My favorite modern translations are the ESV and the NRSV, which are both basically the same translation (both are direct revisions of the 1952 RSV, itself a less literal revision of the ASV), the former with a conservative (often literal and OT-in-light of the NT) and the latter with a liberal (often figurative or gender-neutral) bent. I find it often a good idea to read the ASV, NRSV, and ESV on BibleGateway side-by-side. The NRSV is a de facto academic translation and is one of the few post-1983 complete translations of the Bible accepted by the Roman Catholic Church for private study. Neither is by any means a bad translation, with the NRSV’s greater theological liberalism in translation often leading to greater accuracy. The NASB is generally (by no means always) more literal than these, but it sometimes descends into paraphrase or unnecessarily inserts words into the text without any notification whatsoever (e.g., Mark 6:10), making it less advisable to use than the ASV.

Section 3

I do not have sufficient experience with the HCSB (a fairly unique translation; transliterates the tetragrammaton selectively, a bad decision however you look at it, but makes some refreshing and beneficial breaks from tradition in its translation), NET (said by its defenders to cut down time on explanation of the text by a third due to it often inserting commentary in place of the Bible’s wording), or NABRE (which I found surprisingly theologically liberal, not always in a bad way; i.e., it’s often refreshing) to make remarks on them, but they all have their defenders. Read them all side-by-side at this link.

The most used translation in these United States, the NIV, suffers too much from theological bias (especially against works, which it tends to translate inconsistently to suit sola fide doctrine) and unnecessary departures from literal wording to be advisable, though on occasion (e.g., Galatians 1:19) it ends up having the most accurate rendering of any translation.